








The world’s central banks have undergone dramatic changes in the 
past fifteen years. Increases in independence and transparency have 
been coupled with a shift in focus. Price stability is now the paramount 
objective for the vast majority of modern central bankers. Combined, 
these changes in central bank structure and policy framework have 
yielded substantial benefits. Low and stable inflation has brought 
with it high and stable growth.
Taking recent successes as a starting point, we look at the 
possibility for further improvements. Could countries benefit by 
shifting from inflation targeting to price-path targeting? The answer 
depends on the structure of each country’s economy—specifically, on 
how slowly output growth returns to its sustainable growth rate after 
moving away from the target. If deviations of output from its potential 
are relatively persistent, a country is likely to benefit from a shift to 
price-path targeting. As Svensson (1999b) argues, if the output gap 
is persistent, focusing on the price level rather than the inflation rate 
will contribute to reducing fluctuations in output and inflation under 
a discretionary rule. 
Numerous authors (including some in this volume) discuss the 
benefits associated with implementing a pure inflation-targeting 
regime. Taking the seminal work of Svensson (1999b) as a starting 
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point, we study the relative merits of price-level targeting versus 
inflation targeting. A number of authors examine this comparison 
and come to various conclusions. For example, Barnett and Engineer 
(2000) argue that eliminating price-level drift does a better job than 
inflation targeting in allowing relative prices to allocate resources 
and in reducing tax-related distortions and the unintended transfers 
of wealth between savers and debtors. Chadha and Nolan (2002) 
employ a representative-agent general equilibrium model to compare 
the performance of price-level versus inflation targeting for the 
United Kingdom. Consistent with Svensson’s results, they find that 
the volatility of inflation, output, and interest rates is lower under 
a price-level target than under an inflation target. Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) and Svensson (2003) show that under certain 
conditions, price-level targeting contributes toward avoiding the 
problems associated with the zero nominal interest floor. If the 
economy experiences either deflation or inflation that is lower than 
its target for one period, then price-level targeting implies that the 
inflation rate must be higher in future periods, thereby assisting the 
economy in countering a liquidity trap. 
Pure inflation targeting can create nominal indeterminacy 
because of its forward-looking nature. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002) 
note that forward-looking private agents will sometimes set prices 
in anticipation of monetary policy that validates their expectations 
at any level of inflation. By contrast, price-level targeting has a 
backward-looking feature that eliminates this problem. Dittmar and 
Gavin (2005) employ a flexible-price real business cycle model to show 
that pure inflation targeting leads to multiple equilibria, whereas 
targeting a price-level path can eliminate this indeterminacy. 
Price-path and inflation targeting are not the only choices, 
however. Combinations are also possible. While inflation targeting 
implies that the (log) price level will be a random walk, and price-path 
targeting means that prices will quickly revert to their target and 
be as close to white noise as possible, hybrid rules imply a specific 
level of persistence. Hybrid or average rules that combine the two 
extremes are, in fact, optimal in most cases, as shown by Nessén 
and Vestin (2005). 
Our discussion in this paper focuses on these hybrids, with the 
goal of deriving an optimal rule for a broad set of countries. We build 
on the earlier work of Cecchetti and Kim (2005) as we study the 
horizon over which price-path or inflation targets should be evaluated. 
Following the intuition first provided in King (1999), we examine the 
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equivalence between a rule with a high weight on inflation targeting 
that is evaluated only infrequently and one with a high weight on 
the price-path that is evaluated often. For each country, we are able 
to derive a horizon for target evaluation that would result in optimal 
policy.1 The general result is that when deviations of output from its 
potential are less persistent, the optimal horizon for target evaluation 
will be shorter. 
The remainder of the paper is developed in five sections. Section 1 
provides the theoretical framework that is the basis for our empirical 
examination. Here we discuss the policymaker’s problem and derive 
the optimal inflation/price-path hybrid targeting rule. We then show 
how this has implications for the horizon at which the target should 
be evaluated. Section 2 presents the basic empirical results of the 
paper. We have thirty-one years of annual data for seventy countries; 
for eighteen of these countries, we also have twenty-four years of 
quarterly data. While the larger data set provides some insights, 
structural changes in the 1973–2003 period lead us to focus on the 
quarterly results. Taken together, our results suggest little difference 
between developed and emerging market countries, but the methods of 
detrending the data matter. When we employ filtering techniques that 
allow for time variation in mean growth rates, we (unsurprisingly) 
estimate less persistence in both output and the price level. In 
sections 3 and 4, we look at certain aspects of the results in more 
detail. First, we examine time variation in the estimates. Overall, 
we find that output persistence has not changed much over time, but 
price-level persistence has fallen. Moreover, the declines are larger 
in countries that have adopted publicly announced inflation targets. 
That is, price paths are more stable in these countries. A country’s 
monetary policy regime does matter. Finally, in section 5 we provide 
some concluding remarks.
1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We begin with a bit of theory that is based on Cecchetti and Kim 
(2005). Following Svensson (1999b), that paper examines the case 
in which society cares about the weighted average of inflation and 
1. The horizon for target evaluation is in addition to the time it takes for a policy 
action to have an impact on the central bank’s objectives, usually inflation and the 
output gap.
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output variability. If it were possible to bind central bankers to react to 
shocks in specific ways—that is, to enforce a commitment to a specific 
reaction function—then policymakers should be held accountable for 
minimizing society’s loss function. As Svensson shows, however, 
given discretion over the instrument rule, it may be better to hold 
policymakers accountable for minimizing a different loss function.2 
The appropriate loss function depends on the degree to which output 
is persistent, and Svensson concludes that if the choice is between 
inflation targeting and price-path targeting, then the critical cut-off 
occurs when the autocorrelation of output deviations from potential 
equals one-half.3 Cecchetti and Kim generalize this result, noting that 
inflation and price-path targeting are the limiting cases of a continuum 
of possibilities. That is, many hybrid targeting regimes lie between 
these two options. The mix depends on output persistence.
Cecchetti and Kim (2005, sect. 4.1) present a model derived in 
two distinct steps. First, they derive the solution to the policymaker’s 
problem (under discretion) assuming that the objective function is 
known. Second, given this solution, they find the targeting regime that 
is best from the society’s point of view. To present the results, we start 
by assuming that the central bank minimizes the following function:
L E p p y y
CB t
t t t t
t














   ∑β λ λ
* * 2 2
1 ,                                 (1)
where LCB is the central bank’s loss function; E is the expectation 
operation, p is the log of the actual price level; p* is the desired (target) 
price level; y is log of current output; y* is the log of potential or desired 
output; and β is a discount factor. The targeting regime—whether it 
is inflation targeting, price-path targeting, or something in between—
depends on the definition of p*. To see this, note that inflation 
targeting occurs when
p p t t
* * IT ( )= + −1 π ,                                                                              (2)
where π* is the inflation target. By contrast, price-path targeting is when
2. Price-level or hybrid targeting can be justified under commitment, as well. In 
models with forward-looking components where the social and central bank loss functions 
coincide, such as those described in Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford 
(2005), various versions of price-level and hybrid targeting are optimal. The results in 
the appendix to Cecchetti and Kim (2005), where inflation targeting is optimal under 
commitment when agents are purely backward looking, are a special case of these.
3. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) and Vestin (2006) also discuss this result.
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p p t t
* * * PPT ( )= + −1 π .                                                                           (3)
Under inflation targeting, the current target is last period’s realized 
level of prices plus the increment π*, while under price-path targeting, 
the increment is added to last period’s target. In the language of the 
literature on money-growth targeting, inflation targeting allows for 
“base drift” whereas price-path targeting does not.
It is only a small step from considering equations (2) and (3) in 
isolation to studying a weighted average. This is what Batini and 
Yates (2003) refer to as the hybrid case, in which the price level is 
allowed to drift somewhat after moving away from the target. We 
can write this as 
p p p t t t
* * * * Hybrid
                  
( )= + ( )+ − ( ) + ( )
=
− − η π η π
η
1 1 1
p p p t t − − + − ( ) + 1 1 1 η π
* *,
                                    (4)
where η is the relative weight placed on inflation targeting. The two 
extremes, η = 0 and η = 1, represent price-path and inflation targeting, 
respectively.
Normalizing both π* and y* to zero (so that both the price path 
and output are measured as deviation from the targets), we can now 
rewrite the objective function (equation 1) as
















− ∑β λ η λ 1
2 2 1 .                                        (5)
Following Svensson (1999b), Cecchetti and Kim close the model 
with an open economy neoclassical Phillips curve:




t = + − ( )+ + − ρ α ϕ ε 1 ,                                                       (6)
where yt is now the output gap; pt
e is the expectation of the log price 
level (p) at t; pt
F is the foreign price level denominated in domestic 
currency; ρ, α, and ϕ are constants; and ε is an independent and 
identically distributed shock with varianceσε
2 . 
The role of central bank policymakers is to choose a path for the 
price level, pt, that minimizes the objective function (equation 5) 
subject to the constraint imposed by the dynamics in equation (6). As 
Cecchetti and Kim show, the rational expectations solution for this 
problem yields expressions of the form
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p p by c p t t t t
F
t = + + + ( ) − − η ϕ ε 1 1  and                                                   (7)
y y c p t t t
F
t = + + ( ) + ( ) − ρ α ϕ ε 1 1 ,                                                            (8)
where b and c are complex functions of the structural parameters ρ 
and α and the preference parameters λ and β.4
A number of authors, including Parkin (2000), note a technical 
restriction for the existence of a solution to this problem. The condition 
is that λ has to be sufficiently large relative to ρ. In other words, if 
output is highly persistent and central bankers care sufficiently about 
output variability, then the solution will not exist.5 Policymakers will 
generate infinite price-level volatility in an attempt to meet their 
output stabilization goals. The condition is extremely interesting, as 
it depends on the absolute size of the numbers. That is, it depends 
on the relative importance of inflation and output variability in the 
objective—something that has no time units—and a persistence 
parameter that critically depends on the frequency of the data. The 
lower the data frequency, the smaller ρ will presumably be, and the 
less likely the condition is to bind. We return to the issue of data 
frequency shortly. 
To complete the derivation, we move to society’s problem. We 
assume that the social loss is written in terms of output and inflation 
variability. If we further assume that the preference parameter λ in 
the central bank’s objective and the one in society’s are the same, the 
social loss function is6 
L
S
y = + − ( ) λσ λ σ π
2 2 1 .                                                                           (9)
4. Equations (7) and (8) are later estimated using annual data. Following Cecchetti 
and Kim (2005), the results for the quarterly data analysis come from estimating the 
following equations:
p p b y p e t t i
i
t i p t
F
t = + + + −
=
− ∑ η φ 1
1
4
1  and                                                                              (7′)
y y y p e t t i
i
t i y t
F
t = + + + −
=
− ∑ ρ γ φ 1
1
4
2 ∆ .                                                                                  (8′)
5. See Cecchetti and Kim (2005, p. 179) for the complex formulas.
6. The two lambdas do not need to match. Following Rogoff (1985), the central 
banker’s weight on output and inflation stabilization could deviate from that of society. 
Cecchetti and Kim (2005) examine this possibility, showing when it might be reasonable 
for society to find an inflation-averse central banker. They show that as ρ increases for 
a fixed social level of λ, there is reason to find a central banker with an increasingly 
high value for λ. 
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Cecchetti and Kim show that the value of η that minimizes 








.                                                                                         (10)
As output becomes more persistent (ρ increases toward one), η* 
goes to zero, and the optimal hybrid targeting regime thus approaches 
pure price-path targeting. 
In his discussion of Cecchetti and Kim, Mankiw (2005) notes a 
problem that arises when taking this model to the data. What, Mankiw 
asks, should the frequency of the data be? Cecchetti and Kim focus 
on quarterly data. Is this appropriate? Mankiw suggests pinning 
down the answer to the question by looking at the frequency over 
which expectations are formed and wages are set. Since the crucial 
parameter in the model is the persistence of the output gap (ρ), and 
the output gap results from expectation errors, Mankiw reasons that 
this is where to determine whether quarterly data are appropriate. 
He concludes that the answer is no, and that the model should be 
applied to annual data.
Mankiw comes to this conclusion by focusing on wages. The answer 
might be different if we instead direct our attention to prices. The 
rationale for including prices (or inflation) in the social and central 
bank loss functions is that nominal price changes are inefficient. We 
would like nominal prices to stay fixed for as long as possible. The 
sooner prices return to their target, the better. The implication is that 
the data frequency should match the frequency of price changes.7 
The most recent evidence indicates that the median duration 
of price spells (at the retail level) is 10.6 months in the euro area 
and 4.6 months in the United States (see Dhyne and others, 2005). 
The distribution of price spells is positively skewed, so the mean is 
substantially higher than the median. For the euro area, the mean 
exceeds a year, and it is over six months for the United States. This 
leads us to conclude that the appropriate frequency is somewhere 
between one quarter and one year.
We come to a more informative answer if we pose the problem 
somewhat differently. Instead of asking what the data frequency 
should be for the computation of the optimal hybrid targeting rule, 
7. We thank Gauti Eggertsson for clarifying this argument.
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we can look for a joint estimate of η and the horizon over which the 
central bank is trying to achieve this goal. Both are then measured 
in the units of the data. For example, if we use annual data, then we 
have the optimal hybrid rule at an annual frequency, and it is to be 
evaluated over the horizon computed from annual data.
Here is how it works. First, the ρ and η in equations (7) and (8) have 
no natural time units; nor does the η in the central bank’s objective 
(equation 5). Equation (8), however, shows that if ρ is measured over 
quarterly data—call this ρ(quarterly)—then the corresponding annual 
persistence estimate is approximately ρ(annual) = ρ(quarterly)4, because 
the system in equations (7) and (8) is recursive. That is, the annual ρ 
is the quarterly ρ raised to the fourth power. Equation (7) reveals that 
the behavior of η is exactly analogous: η(annual) = η(quarterly)4. 
We now turn to the solution for the optimal hybrid, where η is a 
function of ρ. For values of η and ρ, we can compute the implied horizon, 









.                                                                                       (11)
For a given persistence in the price level and the output gap, 
equation (11) provides an estimate of the horizon at which a central 
bank that is behaving optimally evaluates its hybrid target. As a 
practical matter, the h that solves equation (11) has to be added to 
the lag that it takes for policy actions to influence the central bank’s 
objectives. 
Figure 1 provides a sense of the relationship between output gap 
persistence (ρ), price-level persistence (η), and the implied horizon 
(h).8 As either η or ρ increases, so does h. That is, more persistence 
in either the price level or the output gap implies a longer interval 
between target evaluations. For example, if η = 0.6, then as ρ rises 
from 0.7 to 0.8, h increases from 1.7 to 2.2. 
The properties of h are related to the conclusions in King (1999) 
and Nessén and Vestin (2005): as the evaluation horizon lengthens, 
the practical difference between inflation and price-path targeting 
disappears. Politicians are likely to hold an inflation-targeting central 
bank accountable for meeting inflation targets over horizons that are 
sufficiently long to make the regime behave similarly to targeting a 
8. The natural time units of h are the same as those used to measure the persistence 
parameters.
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price path. The lower the price-level persistence (η) and the implied 
horizon (h), the closer the economy is to pure price-path targeting. 
In a sense, a low (η, h) pair is equivalent to a high one—that is, they 
can both yield the same value of ηh
. For example, (η, h) = (0.4, 1.5) 
is equivalent to (η, h) = (0.8, 6.1); in both cases ηh = 0.253. As King’s 
logic implies, short-horizon price-path targeting is equivalent to long-
horizon inflation targeting.9 
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our objective is to estimate the hybrid rule and the implied horizon 
for the policy regime in as broad a cross-section of countries as possible. 
To that end, we have assembled annual data on gross domestic product 
(GDP), the aggregate price level, and import prices for seventy 
countries. Moreover, we also have quarterly data for eighteen of the 
Figure 1. Relation between the Optimal Horizon, Price-Level 
Persistence, and Output Persistencea 
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. The relation is based on equation (11) in the text. The optimal horizon is denoted by h, price-level persistence 
by η, and output persistence by ρ. 
9. A second way to approach this problem is to look for the approximate horizon over 
which inflation targeting yields the same variability of the price-level gap. Under the 
hybrid, the variance is proportional to (1 – η2) – 1. Alternatively if the inflation target is 
reset every T periods, then the variance over those intervals is proportional to T. Setting 
these two equal, and given that our estimates of η are in the range of 0.7 to 0.9, we estimate 
the horizon T to lie between two and five (in the same time units as the data).
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OECD countries in the larger sample. (See the data appendix for a 
list of sources.) A full set of results for the annual data are shown in 
table A1 in the appendix. Table 1 provides a summary. 
The estimates are somewhat sensitive to the manner in which 
we estimate the output and price-path gaps. We present two sets of 
results: one based on assuming a simple linear trend and a send that 
uses a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the parameter set to 400. 
Based on the results for the full sample of seventy countries estimated 
over the 1973–2003 period, the average estimated horizon, h, equals 
3.65 years when we use linear detrending and only 2.35 years when 
we apply the HP filter. We interpret these horizon estimates as being 
in addition to the time that it normally takes for monetary policy 
actions to have an impact on inflation and the output gap. That is, h 
is the horizon in addition to the policy lag, which is 1.5 to 2.0 years 
in industrialized countries.
Table 1 reports estimates for four groups of countries: the full sample 
of seventy countries, forty-five non-OECD countries, twenty-five OECD 
countries, and twelve euro-area countries. Overall, the groupings are 
not all that different. They all show some range in the estimates, 
and the persistence and implied horizon estimates all fall when we 
use the HP filter. The reason for the drop in the estimated horizon is 
straightforward. The HP filter essentially removes a time-varying mean 
from the growth rate—in other words, it allows for a linear trend that 
is moving around. As many authors note, allowing for time variation 
in the mean of data reduces estimates of persistence.10 For example, if 
the mean of a time series shifts once and for all on a specific date, the 
mean shift is, by assumption, very persistent. If one were to estimate an 
autoregressive parameter like ρ or η in equations (7) and (8) ignoring the 
mean shift, the estimates would be high. Explicitly accounting for the 
shift unambiguously lowers the estimate of persistence. Now consider 
what happens to the estimate of h if we reduce both ρ and η. For example, 
if ρ = 0.8 and η = 0.8, then h is roughly 3.0. If ρ and η both fall to 0.7, 
this reduces the estimate of h to 2.0. The estimate of h will also drop if 
the estimate of ρ falls, but η does not.
Fortunately, the qualitative picture painted by the data is not all 
that different when we shift between the two methods of detrending. 
For the annual data, horizons for policy evaluation after the effect 
on inflation and output are two to three years, with estimates of η 
10. See, for example, Cecchetti and Debelle (2006).
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in excess of 0.7 for more than fifty countries. These countries are 
behaving as if they were near pure inflation targeting. Based on 
the quarterly data, estimates of the horizon (after the full effect of 
policy) are substantially shorter at one-half to one year, but again the 
economies are close to targeting inflation, presenting estimates of η 
between 0.6 and 0.8. (To facilitate comparison, we quote all estimates 
of h in years, regardless of the frequency of the data from which they 
are computed.) 
In the end, we find the analysis of annual data unsatisfactory. 
It seems wrong to assume that economies have been stable over the 
turbulent decades of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. We therefore turn 
to the smaller set of eighteen countries for which we have quarterly 
data beginning in 1980. Again, we present two sets of results: one 
based on linear detrending and the second using the HP filter (with 
a smoothing parameter of 1,600). Tables 2 and 3 report the complete 
results, while table 4 contains a brief summary. Each table includes 
results for two time periods: 1980–91 and 1992–2003. They also report 
bootstrap standard errors.11 
For the period from 1980 to 1991, linear detrending yields an 
average estimated implied horizon of 1.35 years, while the HP-filtered 
estimates are half that, at 0.68 years. For the more recent sample, 
from 1992 to 2003, the average estimate of the horizon obtained using 
HP-filtered data is half what we get from linear detrended data. The 
quarterly estimates are uniformly lower than the ones we obtain 
using annual data. That is, we find both lower price-persistence 
and a smaller implied horizon for target evaluation. This almost 
surely reflects the sample period we are studying. The annual data 
includes the much more turbulent 1970s—a period in which inflation 
was generally higher and more variable than in recent years, while 
growth tended to be lower and more volatile. All in all, this leads us 
to be more confident in the higher-frequency estimates. 
With regard to the precision of the estimates, we note two things. 
First, using the 1980–91 data, the estimates of the implied horizon 
11. The parametric recursive bootstrap (Freedman and Peters, 1984) used here 
assumes that the estimated model for each country in equations (7′) and (8′) is correctly 
specified, and that the corresponding error terms are independent but not identically 
distributed. We resample with replacement from the matrix consisting of both estimated 
residuals from both equations. This allows us to generate 1,000 “pseudo”-samples for 
each country, which are then used to compute replications of the estimate of the horizon. 
The reported standard errors are obtained from computing the standard deviation of 
these replications.
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1980–91 1992–2003
Country ρ η h ρ η h
Australia 0.88 0.98 1.89 0.86 0.97 1.71
(0.09) (0.07) (1.63) (0.10) (0.08) (1.82)
Belgium 0.88 0.69 0.88 0.73 0.60 0.46
(0.06) (0.07) (0.31) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16)
Canada 0.88 1.07 3.94 0.88 0.83 1.20
(0.07) (0.08) (7.17) (0.07) (0.11) (0.56)
Denmark 0.82 0.94 1.16 0.76 0.69 0.57
(0.10) (0.08) (0.51) (0.10) (0.13) (0.16)
Finland 0.71 0.82 0.59 0.90 0.96 2.12
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.94)
France 0.90 0.92 1.73 0.91 0.77 1.22
(0.05) (0.09) (0.71) (0.05) (0.12) (0.43)
Germany 0.95 0.78 1.64 0.78 0.91 0.90
(0.10) (0.11) (0.65) (0.13) (0.06) (0.46)
Italy 0.77 0.93 0.90 0.72 0.92 0.71
(0.10) (0.05) (0.37) (0.12) (0.03) (0.40)
Japan 0.86 0.69 0.79 0.72 0.79 0.58
(0.07) (0.11) (0.35) (0.16) (0.09) (0.26)
Korea, Rep. (S) 0.41 0.99 0.31 0.80 0.72 0.68
(0.14) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13)
Netherlands 0.80 0.89 0.95 0.97 0.89 2.99
(0.09) (0.05) (0.33) (0.06) (0.09) (2.26)
New Zealand 0.54 1.05 0.47 0.62 0.81 0.45
(0.15) (0.06) (0.29) (0.14) (0.09) (0.17)
Norway 0.85 1.01 1.73 0.81 0.54 0.53
(0.07) (0.07) (1.16) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
Portugal 0.83 0.74 0.77 0.89 0.75 1.04
(0.06) (0.10) (0.22) (0.06) (0.11) (0.29)
Spain 0.76 1.07 1.20 0.83 0.81 0.90
(0.11) (0.11) (0.59) (0.06) (0.12) (0.28)
Sweden 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.90 0.70 0.94
(0.13) (0.08) (0.34) (0.06) (0.08) (0.24)
United Kingdom 0.97 0.88 3.04 0.81 0.57 0.56
(0.07) (0.11) (1.97) (0.09) (0.14) (0.21)
United States 0.83 1.01 1.49 0.82 0.74 0.75
(0.06) (0.06) (0.58) (0.07) (0.09) (0.27)
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. Horizon is measured in years. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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1980–91 1992–2003
Country ρ η h ρ η h
Australia 0.82 0.87 0.97 0.65 0.88 0.54
(0.11) (0.07) (0.65) (0.13) (0.07) (0.46)
Belgium 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.59 0.46 0.29
(0.12) (0.06) (0.43) (0.15) (0.12) (0.24)
Canada 0.81 1.07 1.70 0.80 0.71 0.67
(0.09) (0.08) (2.42) (0.08) (0.14) (0.20)
Denmark 0.55 0.49 0.27 0.64 0.28 0.25
(0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.07)
Finland 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.84 0.74 0.79
(0.06) (0.11) (0.29) (0.07) (0.12) (0.63)
France 0.87 0.79 1.04 0.82 0.47 0.49
(0.09) (0.07) (0.61) (0.09) (0.14) (0.23)
Germany 0.65 0.56 0.36 0.64 0.74 0.43
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.45)
Italy 0.77 0.86 0.79 0.65 0.85 0.52
(0.12) (0.07) (0.50) (0.12) (0.06) (0.25)
Japan 0.67 0.62 0.41 0.45 0.57 0.24
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)
Korea, Rep. (S) 0.36 0.91 0.25 0.74 0.37 0.34
(0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.15) (0.11)
Netherlands 0.61 0.84 0.46 0.89 0.80 1.17
(0.14) (0.07) (0.26) (0.09) (0.10) (1.54)
New Zealand 0.28 1.10 0.23 0.58 0.73 0.37
(0.17) (0.08) (0.55) (0.12) (0.07) (0.20)
Norway 0.70 0.87 0.62 0.32 0.38 0.16
(0.10) (0.11) (0.26) (0.15) (0.17) (0.08)
Portugal 0.84 0.79 0.89 0.81 0.74 0.72
(0.10) (0.08) (0.71) (0.09) (0.13) (0.39)
Spain 0.60 0.75 0.41 0.77 0.70 0.59
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.28)
Sweden 0.63 0.92 0.53 0.82 0.45 0.47
(0.13) (0.07) (0.37) (0.05) (0.11) (0.24)
United Kingdom 0.87 0.83 1.15 0.78 0.40 0.39
(0.08) (0.09) (0.55) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11)
United States 0.71 0.89 0.66 0.80 0.70 0.66
(0.07) (0.07) (0.19) (0.10) (0.09) (0.22)
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. Horizon is measured in years. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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are not only high, but also imprecise. We see many fewer estimates 
above four in 1992–2003, using the linear trend. Second, allowing 
for a time-varying mean has a dramatic effect: our estimates of 
persistence and the implied horizon both fall substantially, and 
precision is increased (see table 3). 
A complete analysis would build uncertainty directly into the 
optimization problem. In the setup we use here, the important 
source of uncertainty is the imprecision in the model parameter 
estimates—that is, the uncertainty about η and ρ. In the elementary 
framework described by Brainard (1967), policymakers should act 
cautiously when they are unsure of something like the elasticity 
of their inflation or output objective with respect to their interest 
rate instrument; in particular, they should not react strongly to 
observed shocks.12 More recently, Onatski and Stock (2002) describe 
circumstances under which uncertainty can lead to bigger, not smaller, 
reactions. Theirs is a risk-management result: policymakers need to 
avoid very bad outcomes. If, for example, inflation might be a random 
walk, then a policymaker who cares about inflation variability should 
react more aggressively to any possibility of inflation changing. 
Balancing these two results—one advocating smaller reactions and 
the other larger—is a daunting task for policymakers.
Returning to our results, we note that uncertainty about persistence 
in both output and price-path gaps fell in the last decade. This clearly 
makes life easier for policymakers.
3. TIME VARIATION
While interesting, the estimates of the previous section are clearly 
unsatisfactory. Substantial evidence indicates that persistence in 
output and prices varies over time.13 This, combined with the known 
changes in monetary policy regime, suggests that both η and h may 
undergo important changes during our sample. Unfortunately, thirty 
years of annual data—the size of the sample for our large cross-
section of seventy countries—is insufficient to study time variation. 
Instead, we focus on the twenty-four years of quarterly data covering 
eighteen countries. 
12. Data uncertainty—that is, imprecise estimates of the state of the economy—
does not influence the problem in the same way, as recently proved by Svensson and 
Woodford (2003).
13. For an examination of time variation in output persistence, see Cecchetti, Flores-
Lagunes, and Krause (2005); for inflation persistence, see Cecchetti and Debelle (2006). 
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We have split the sample in half, creating subperiods for 1980 
to 1991 and 1992 to 2003. The results using linear detrending are 
in table 2, while those using the HP filtered data are in table 3. 
With regard to output persistence, our estimate of ρ falls in nine 
of the eighteen countries when we use constant linear detrending, 
and in eleven when we allow for time variation in mean growth. 
To provide a closer look at the second case, figure 2 plots the range 
of estimates of ρ obtained using a five-year moving window. The 
general pattern is that output persistence increased between the 
early to mid-1980s and the eight years ending in 2003. Persistence 
also tends to be higher in the early 1990s than either before or after, 
although this is not evident in the figure. For all but two countries 
(Denmark and New Zealand), the output persistence estimates tend 
to lie primarily above one-half.
Figure 2. Range of Output Persistence for Eighteen OECD 
Countriesa
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. For each country, the thin vertical line represents the overall range of the estimates, while the top and bottom of the 
bar is the estimate at the beginning and the end of the sample period. A solid bar indicates that estimated persistence 
fell between the early to mid-1980s and the 1996–2003 period, while a white bar represents an increase. 
The persistence in the deviation of prices from trend has tended 
to decline substantially over time. When we use linear detrending, 
persistence falls in thirteen of the eighteen countries; applying an 
HP filter results in estimated declines in sixteen countries (see 
table 2). This shift toward price-path targeting is confirmed by 
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the more flexible time-variation estimates reported in figure 3. 
Comparing the early 1980s with the most recent five-year period 
reveals that the estimated degree of price-level persistence declined 
in sixteen of the eighteen countries. Moreover, the increases were 
very modest in the two countries where the estimates rise (Italy 
and the Netherlands). 
Figure 3. Range of Price Persistence for Eighteen OECD 
Countriesa
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. For each country, the thin vertical line represents the overall range of the estimates, while the top and bottom of the 
bar is the estimate at the beginning and the end of the sample period. A solid bar indicates that estimated persistence 
fell between the early to mid-1980s and the 1996–2003 period, while a white bar represents an increase. 
Estimates of the implied horizon for target evaluation show less 
of a tendency to vary (see figure 4). When we use linearly detrended 
data, five countries show an increase in h; the number rises to seven 
with HP filtering. Most of the increases are relatively small, however, 
at one-quarter or less. By contrast, where we estimate reductions, 
they are large.
The horizon h is the value that equates price-level persistence 
with optimal price level persistence. It thus equates the optimal 
convex combination of inflation and price-path targeting with that 
in the data. This means that the horizon, plus the lag with which 
policy affects inflation and the output gap, is an indicator of the 
timeframe policymakers should have in mind in order to achieve 
the minimum loss. 
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4. INFLATION TARGETERS VERSUS NONTARGETERS
The data in tables 2 and 3 provide the basis for exploring whether 
there are any systematic differences between countries that publicly 
state that they target inflation and those that do not. For this 
comparison, we run a fixed-effects regression to establish whether 
countries that adopted inflation targeting in the 1990s experienced a 
significantly different behavior of output and price persistence (ρ and η) 
or the implied horizon for target evaluation (h) than nontargeters. 
The regressions are of the following form:
y a b u i t i i t i t , , , = + + Target ,                                                                (12)
where yi,t is ρ, η, or h for country i in period t; Targeti,t is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if country i is targeting inflation 
in period t; and ai is a country-specific fixed effect. For each country 
we take the difference in equation (12) across the two subperiods of 
our quarterly data. We report estimates of b, the impact of publicly 
announced inflation targeting, in table 5.
Figure 4. Range of Horizon Estimates for Eighteen OECD 
Countriesa
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. For each country, the thin vertical line represents the overall range of the estimates, while the top and bottom 
of the bar is the estimate at the beginning and the end of the sample period. A solid bar represents a decrease 
in the optimal horizon between the first and last period; a white bar represents an increase in the horizon. h is 
measured in years.
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We might expect inflation targeting countries to experience higher 
output volatility.14 However, there is no reason to think that the 
monetary policy regime would have a direct impact on the persistence 
of output, and this is what we find. The first column of table 5 reports 
that inflation targeters experience slightly higher output persistence 
than nontargeters, but the differences are small in magnitude and 
not statistically significantly different from zero.







persistence (η) Horizon (h)
HP filtering
Inflation targeting (b) 0.06 –0.25 –1.10
(0.42) (0.01) (0.07)
Linear detrending
Inflation targeting (b) 0.04 –0.15 –2.33
(0.47)  (0.04) (0.17)
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
a. Regressions use HP detrending; p values are in parentheses. 
It is both reassuring and unsurprising to find that the adoption 
of inflation targeting changes a country’s price-level persistence. Our 
results show inflation targeting is correlated with large declines in 
η (regardless of the detrending procedure we use). The fall in the 
estimates is quite large—between 0.15 and 0.25. This means that the 
price process in inflation-targeting countries is substantially closer to 
price-path targeting than to inflation targeting. The implied horizon 
for target evaluation falls by more in these countries, as well—between 
one and two quarters. 
5. CONCLUSION
The details of a country’s monetary policy regime should depend on 
that country’s economic structure. Whether the optimal approach pure 
inflation targeting, pure price-path targeting, or some hybrid depends 
on the country’s output persistence. Once policymakers realize that the 
horizon for target evaluation can vary, any hybrid rule can be optimal. 
14. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) report that inflation-targeting countries tend to 
experience more output volatility than countries that do not target inflation.
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For example, a rule that is weighted heavily toward inflation targeting 
but is evaluated over a long horizon will be equivalent to a rule that 
grants priority to the price-path but employs a shorter horizon.
This result bears a striking resemblance to Svensson’s (1999a) 
important observation that the speed at which a central bank strives 
to bring inflation back to its target level depends on the weight of 
output fluctuations in its objective function. The higher the weight 
on output variability, the slower the path back. The same thing 
is happening here. The more persistent output, the more output 
variability is created by explicitly targeting inflation, and the longer 
the time horizon for policy evaluation. Thus, the more policymakers 
care about output variability or the more prone the economy is to 
prolonged movements away from potential output, the longer the time 
horizon over which policymakers should be operating.
Turning to our empirical results, we find that countries vary 
quite a bit in the degree to which output and the price-level are 
persistent. While developed and emerging market countries present 
few differences, inflation-targeting countries show a distinctly 
lower degree of price-level persistence. Moreover, our estimates of 
persistence generally fall when we adopt methods that allow for 
potential output growth to vary over time. Our comparison of the 1980s 
and the 1990s (based on the more reliable quarterly data) indicates 
that output persistence has not changed, but price-level persistence 
has fallen. This is surely, in part, a consequence of the adoption of 
formal inflation targets. Finally, our results imply that the optimal 
horizon for target evaluation has gotten shorter. There is a sense in 
which countries are closer to price-path targeting than they are to 
inflation targeting.
09.Cecchett i 265-290.indd 01/03/2007, 18:15 285286 Stephen G. Cecchetti  and Stefan Krause
APPENDIX
Our data sources are as follows. Annual data on GDP, the 
consumer price index (CPI), and import prices data were obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM (December 2004). Quarterly data for seasonally 
adjusted GDP, CPI, and import prices were obtained from the OECD 
Economic Outlook 76 (December 2004). Data on inflation targeting 
were taken from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). 
Table A1 provides our results by country, based on the annual 
data from 1973 to 2003, using linear detrending and the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. 
Table A1. Annual Data, 1970–2003
Linear detrending HP filtering
Country ρ η h ρ η h
Algeria 0.91 0.94 8.76 0.82 0.87 3.92
Argentina 0.75 0.93 3.23 0.63 0.80 1.83
Australia 0.48 0.82 1.28 0.48 0.80 1.24
Austria 0.54 0.84 1.51 0.46 0.64 1.06
Belgium 0.50 0.86 1.38 0.35 0.62 0.82
Bolivia 0.90 0.49 2.58 0.91 0.50 2.81
Burkina Faso 0.24 0.66 0.65 0.04 0.63 0.32
Burundi 0.85 0.60 2.56 0.76 0.48 1.68
Cameroon 0.87 0.78 3.90 0.84 0.62 2.56
Canada 0.79 0.57 2.03 0.75 0.75 2.41
Chile 0.80 0.51 1.92 0.60 0.55 1.28
Colombia 0.92 0.73 4.44 0.76 0.73 2.42
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.91 0.68 3.84 0.79 0.44 1.71
Costa Rica 0.97 0.67 5.86 0.84 0.55 2.33
Côte d’Ivoire 0.84 0.82 3.79 0.81 0.64 2.45
Denmark 0.52 0.89 1.50 0.53 0.86 1.49
Dominican Republic 0.84 0.85 4.06 0.68 0.94 2.59
Ecuador 0.45 0.69 1.06 0.43 0.72 1.06
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.82 1.02 5.89 0.74 1.03 3.89
El Salvador 0.79 0.99 4.45 0.79 0.96 4.19
Finland 0.87 0.78 3.86 0.82 0.70 2.82
France 0.71 0.85 2.46 0.70 0.92 2.69
Gabon 0.49 0.82 1.33 0.43 0.65 0.98
Gambia, The 0.50 0.79 1.29 0.41 0.92 1.16
Germany 0.71 0.85 2.52 0.63 0.87 2.01
Ghana 0.91 0.58 3.13 0.65 0.47 1.29
Greece 0.88 1.08 14.87 0.69 1.34 9.35
Guatemala 0.91 0.93 8.04 0.98 0.90 16.08
Haiti 0.84 0.89 4.47 0.73 0.81 2.45
Honduras 0.78 1.04 4.90 0.74 0.88 2.85
Hungary 0.88 0.74 3.85 0.83 0.64 2.62
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Country ρ η h ρ η h
Iceland 0.85 0.87 4.46 0.76 0.87 3.06
India 0.58 0.56 1.25 0.28 0.48 0.63
Indonesia 0.91 0.71 4.14 0.83 0.62 2.53
Ireland 0.93 0.94 10.18 0.80 0.85 3.39
Italy 0.48 0.90 1.38 0.28 0.91 0.83
Japan 0.90 0.48 2.50 0.74 0.43 1.50
Kenya 0.86 0.84 4.25 0.71 0.83 2.38
Korea, Rep. 0.84 0.53 2.26 0.70 0.68 1.89
Lesotho 0.47 0.77 1.21 0.42 0.37 0.77
Luxembourg 0.82 0.79 3.23 0.75 0.62 1.98
Madagascar 0.55 0.85 1.57 0.27 0.78 0.74
Malaysia 0.75 0.51 1.68 0.57 0.44 1.08
Mexico 0.74 0.99 3.65 0.75 0.87 2.97
Morocco 0.40 0.87 1.10 0.13 0.71 0.48
Netherlands 0.83 0.85 3.88 0.77 0.78 2.67
New Zealand 0.74 0.93 3.10 0.74 0.90 2.94
Nicaragua 0.89 0.86 5.50 0.53 0.88 1.53
Nigeria 0.75 0.88 2.99 0.47 0.84 1.26
Norway 0.76 0.86 2.97 0.73 0.91 2.88
Pakistan 0.87 0.70 3.32 0.69 0.74 1.99
Paraguay 0.62 1.00 2.34 0.70 0.86 2.42
Peru 0.78 0.80 2.82 0.65 0.84 2.03
Philippines 0.81 0.92 4.13 0.74 0.34 1.31
Portugal 0.64 0.87 2.07 0.57 0.95 1.82
Rwanda 0.60 0.72 1.55 0.55 0.67 1.31
Senegal 0.69 0.77 2.07 0.42 0.63 0.96
Sierra Leone 0.85 0.96 5.79 0.54 0.92 1.66
South Africa 0.59 1.03 2.15 0.47 1.00 1.45
Spain 0.81 0.77 3.01 0.81 0.91 4.08
Swaziland 0.88 1.00 8.49 0.77 0.55 1.89
Sweden 0.78 0.90 3.45 0.75 1.00 3.88
Switzerland 0.62 0.84 1.89 0.58 0.84 1.68
Thailand 0.85 0.52 2.27 0.78 0.64 2.22
Togo 0.59 0.89 1.80 0.51 0.89 1.47
Trinidad and Tobago 0.99 0.90 18.85 0.81 0.64 2.46
United Kingdom 0.69 0.67 1.81 0.80 0.69 2.56
United States 0.52 0.52 1.07 0.58 0.71 1.44
Uruguay 0.81 1.08 6.78 0.65 1.12 3.18
Venezuela, RB 0.80 0.80 3.12 0.73 0.82 2.48
Source: Own computations based on IFS and OECD Economic Outlook data.
Table A1. (continued)
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